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The continuity hypothesis (1) posits that there is continuity, of some form, between 
waking and dreaming mentation. A recent body of work has provided convincing evi-
dence for different aspects of continuity, for instance that some salient experiences from 
waking life seem to feature in dreams over others, with a particular role for emotional 
arousal as accompanying these experiences, both during waking and while asleep. 
However, discontinuities have been somewhat dismissed as being either a product of 
activation-synthesis, an error within the consciousness binding process during sleep, 
a methodological anomaly, or simply as yet unexplained. This paper presents an over-
view of discontinuity within dreaming and waking cognition, arguing that disruptions of 
consciousness are as common a feature of waking cognition as of dreaming cognition, 
and that processes of sleep-dependent memory consolidation of autobiographical 
experiences can in part account for some of the discontinuities of sleeping cognition 
in a functional way. By drawing upon evidence of the incorporation, fragmentation, and 
reorganization of memories within dreams, this paper proposes a model of discontinuity 
whereby the fragmentation of autobiographical and episodic memories during sleep, as 
part of the consolidation process, render salient aspects of those memories subsequently 
available for retrieval in isolation from their contextual features. As such discontinuity of 
consciousness in sleep is functional and normal.
Keywords: sleep, dreaming consciousness, autobiographical memory, memory consolidation, continuity theory
ContinUity in its GeneraL ForM
The continuity hypothesis (1) posits that there is continuity, of some form, between waking and 
dreaming. A recent body of work [e.g., Ref. (1–10)] has provided convincing evidence for the charac-
teristics of specific aspects of continuity, for instance that some salient experiences from waking-life 
feature in dreams over others. Five factors have been proposed to account for the incorporation 
of waking-life experiences into dreams (11): the emotionality of the waking-life experience; the 
type of waking-life activity; personality traits; time intervals; and time of night. Emotional arousal 
consistently seems to accompany these experiences, both during waking (original experience) and 
while dreaming [for a review, see Ref. (10)].
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Continuity between dreaming and waking, therefore, appears 
to provide a framework for studying and measuring the extent of 
overlap, or shared variance, between different states of conscious-
ness (11). This holds appeal in that—hypothetically—scholars 
could build models predicting dream content and characteristics 
given knowledge about specific predictor parameters, such as the 
emotionality of past experiences and time spent asleep. Previous 
attempts to conceptualize variability in dream behaviors such as 
dream recall (12) left 91.6% variance unexplained. As such the 
task at hand is ambitious. It also assumes that any as yet explained 
variance may be problematic, or simply, “error.” Indeed, disconti-
nuities have been somewhat dismissed as being either a product 
of activation-synthesis [for instance, see Ref. (13)], an error 
within the consciousness binding process during sleep, a meth-
odological anomaly, or simply as yet unexplained. Furthermore, 
the concept of continuity remains somewhat ill-defined (14). This 
paper presents a conception of discontinuity within dreaming 
and waking cognition for the first time, arguing that disruptions 
of consciousness are as common a feature of waking cognition 
as of dreaming cognition, and that processes of sleep-dependent 
memory consolidation of autobiographical experiences can 
in part account for many of the discontinuities of sleeping 
cognition in a functional way. By drawing upon evidence of the 
incorporation, fragmentation, and reorganization of memories 
within dreams, this paper proposes a model of the fragmentation 
of autobiographical and episodic memories during sleep, which 
manifest as discontinuity during sleep, rendering salient aspects 
of those memories subsequently available for consolidation in 
isolation from their contextual features.
In sum the discontinuities of cognition in dreams have pre-
viously been recognized as being both typical of normal sleep 
mentation behavior, and possibly indicative of problematic dis-
sociative symptoms, such as schizophrenia [e.g., Ref. (15, 16)]. 
This paper summarizes the elements of continuous and dis-
continuous processing across sleep and wake, recognizing that 
discontinuities in form, of cognition and of consciousness are 
typical and indeed functional of waking processing as well as 
in dreams (i.e., sleeping processing). At first glance, this may 
appear to be at odds with literature and evidence demonstrating 
that dreaming cognition, as a reflection of rapid eye movement 
(REM) sleep (13, 17), is dissociative and, therefore, symptomatic 
of psychosis. However, this paper will conceptualize discontinuity 
independently from concepts of continuity and dissociation in 
order to clarify this standpoint.
The continuity and discontinuity of dreaming mentation has 
to date been explored in a handful of studies, with the latter in 
part being related to the experience of bizarreness. This paper 
provides an alternative account of such discontinuities and 
attempts to conceptualize dreaming cognition as being function-
ally discontinuous for the first time, while offering theoretical 
accounts of continuity and discontinuity across sleep and wake.
There has thus far been little agreement over a definition of 
the term, “continuity,” when it refers to the carryover of aspects 
of waking life into dreams and dreams into waking life (14). This 
paper attempts to clarity this and proposes a workable conception 
of continuity, with reference to the retrieval of prior experiences 
into consciousness at any given time.
ContinUity oF ConsCioUsness
The field of sleep science well recognizes that sleep is a hetero-
geneous state. As distinct stages of sleep are defined by specific 
patterns of neural activity, measured using electroencephalogy, 
we assume that cognition during sleep changes also. What is 
less clear is how consciousness, usually measured using sleep 
or dream “mentation” reports, changes in line with this. This 
is less clear because it is difficult to access reports of conscious 
experience from sleep, as recall of those experiences is poor and 
changeable as an individual wakes from sleep.1 Perhaps, due to 
this methodological challenge, there has been relatively little 
interest in consciousness during sleep within the field of sleep 
science. Dream researchers, on the other hand, use a variety of 
methods to capture fragments of conscious experience from 
sleep, including at times relying on spontaneous awakenings 
or the “most recent dream” method of recall and report, which 
likely bias findings to a sample of REM sleep dreams. Dreams 
sampled from REM are, indeed, typically easier to recall than 
dreams from other stages of sleep (18) and are also more bizarre, 
lengthy and emotionally intense. Comparable changes have 
also been documented from dreams sampled across the night, 
shifting from early (more coordinated) to late (more bizarre and 
discontinuous) (7, 19, 20). This seems somewhat different to the 
traditional view of waking conscious thought as focused, under 
control, and efficient. To illustrate this, Hartmann (21) depicted 
a model of consciousness as a dimension ranging from focused 
thought in wake at one end, to looser, hyperassociative cognition 
in REM sleep at the other, with a variety of intermediate states 
such as daydreaming and non-REM sleep featuring some degree 
of both control and bizarreness.
However, it seems vastly over-simplistic to think of waking 
consciousness as being homogeneous. It also seems somewhat 
optimistic to characterize waking thought as consistently focused 
and efficient. Take for example the metacognitive awareness of 
realizing that you have been trying to read the same paragraph of 
text for some time, without really having processed any of it. Or 
the conscious act of daydreaming: a part-focused activity perhaps 
with a pleasant goal but one that requires fantasy, mind-wandering 
and a loss of engagement with reality. Other examples combining 
high-level metacognitive functioning with a loss of engagement 
with reality include experience deja-vu, having involuntary auto-
biographical memories (AMs) interrupt focused thought, and 
meditation. During wake, we often appear not to notice events 
in our immediate environment (for a more dramatic example 
consider change blindness, in which observers often fail to notice 
major visual changes to a stimulus). As such, consciousness is 
extremely discontinuous, particularly with its focus sometimes 
being on the external environment and sometimes detaching 
1 It is assumed, here, that dreaming is considered to be a reflection of conscious 
activity during sleep and that, as such, it is not different to sleeping cognition 
or even reflective of specific stages of sleep. Indeed, several studies demonstrate 
that dreams can be successfully sampled from sleep onset, non-REM as well as 
REM stages under appropriate systematic conditions [e.g., Ref. (18)]. As such, the 
definition of dreaming preferred here is a report of a mental activity experienced 
during sleep.
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from this almost completely, with the conscious awareness being 
directed toward internal states of reflection. Furthermore, most 
theories of consciousness distinguish between the more essential 
and automatic processes of responding to environmental needs, 
and the high-order cognitive processes of awareness of self in 
place and time [e.g., Ref. (22, 23)].
While there seems to be change in the manifestation and per-
haps function of consciousness both across sleep and wake, and 
within each of those states, there also exists continuity. Continuity 
across sleep and wake to some extent is unsurprising as the same 
neurophysiological and cognitive system (i.e., the person) func-
tions across these states. Across wake, dreaming and daydream-
ing, for example, we are also able to recall our past experiences, 
to demonstrate awareness of moments when we somewhat lose 
engagement with reality and transport our present conscious 
awareness to the future in the form of planning and setting goals. 
Thus, consciousness in part involves the activation and awareness 
of memory. Memories for our own personal experiences, AMs 
(24–26) may provide a framework for such continuity over time. 
Indeed, the AM system acknowledges that a personal life story 
changes over time, with memories for specific experiences being 
updated and constructed in accordance with long-term goals and 
identities (25).
One way of conceptualizing continuity then is in terms of 
the activation of memories across time. Indeed, a dream that is 
continuous with waking life should, in theory, feature real experi-
ences, or AMs. Continuity, therefore, would be high if AMs 
were activated and recalled accurately and in full. Conversely 
discontinuity, or low continuity, would prevail if AMs were 
activated partially or inaccurately. The problem with this view 
is that very rarely are AMs recalled in full and accurately. To 
recall an experience fully, with many details as featured in the 
original experience, would be to recall an episodic memory (24, 
27, 28). Very rarely do we recall episodes in this way. Rather, 
we remember part-details and at times fill in the blanks, creat-
ing a narrative that aligns well with a goal or identity (26). 
Furthermore, this seems characteristic of sleeping mentation 
as well as wake (8, 29). As such, we can present two arguments: 
(i) consciousness is varied across both sleep and wake, yet (ii) in 
both states continuity of memory may not prevail.
Previous studies have explored the overlap, or continuity, of 
cognitive processing style from waking life to dreaming. Hobson 
et al.’s (13) activation-input-modulation (AIM) model of dream-
ing assumes that dreaming is illogical and lacks self-reflective 
awareness and directed thought, and it points to neurophysi-
ological changes in REM sleep as the correlate for that mode of 
thought (30). However, empirical explorations of the continuity 
of cognition across sleep and wake have reflected more simi-
larities than differences in cognition and metacognition (31), on 
measures of internal commentary, public self-awareness, fre-
quency of emotion, self-reflection, and thwarted intentions. The 
only measure of cognition on which the two states differed were 
choice, event-related self-reflection and affect, with dreams being 
more emotional but having fewer feelings of volition, suggesting 
that dreaming and waking cognition are largely comparable in 
many respects (31). It is widely reported that the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex is relatively attenuated during REM sleep (32–34), 
which may well account for the reduced volition during REM 
sleep. However, we must be careful not to over-simplify these 
findings, recognizing that volition is still possible during sleep, 
as evidenced by the wealth of empirical work into the experience 
of lucid dreaming. Taken together, there is much evidence for 
comparable cognitive processing across sleep and wake. Kahan 
and LaBerge (35) suggest that differences between waking and 
dreaming cognition may be quantitative; there being more of 
certain cognitions in waking than dreaming and vice versa, but 
not qualitative, since there were incidences of the different types 
of cognitions sampled from both states.
Another way of accounting for the processing styles across 
wake and dreaming has been evidenced by Kahn and Hobson 
(36), who distinguished between thinking within dreams, which 
they argue was similar to waking thought states, and thinking 
about dreams, which they argued differed. Here, the authors 
compared cognitive functioning in dreams with that of wake, by 
asking participants questions about specific dream experiences. 
They highlighted that thinking within the dream is similar to 
thinking when awake even though some implausible activities and 
events within dreams are accepted without question (“thinking 
about …”), whereas in wake we are aware of the source of events. 
This awareness of the origin of events as being either internal, such 
as a thought or a dream, or external in that it is truly perceived, 
is known as reality monitoring (37). Reality monitoring is known 
to be deficient during dreaming, when we accept surrounding 
circumstances without question, with the exception of experi-
encing lucidity, when we become aware that we are dreaming 
(36, 38). Nevertheless we have further evidence that dreaming and 
waking cognition is largely comparable, with dreaming reflecting 
a sleep state in which reality monitoring is typically reduced. This 
gives rise to the possibility that the dreamer can process, or think 
about, scenarios that would not be encountered in waking life, 
perhaps as a rehearsal strategy of some kind [e.g., Ref. (39)].
This view is reiterated by Kozmová and Wolman (40), who 
point out that the differences between the findings of cognitive 
researchers and neurophysiological researchers may be explained 
by the fact that while Kahan and colleagues are focused on cogni-
tion within a dream, Hobson and colleagues in theories like the 
AIM model of dreaming focus more on features of dreaming such 
as uncertainty about people and places, and incongruous imagery. 
Nevertheless, the specific features of dreams as compared to wak-
ing memories may reflect the cognitive processing capacities at 
the time of being experienced and recalled, and consequently it 
is difficult to separate out cognition from features. In their study, 
Kozmová and Wolman (40) identified thought units as featuring 
cognitive or metacognitive processing, such as being analytical 
or operational, and in doing so illustrated the complexity of 
cognitions available in dreaming, concluding that the content of 
the dream (be it bizarre or not) does not preclude the applica-
tion of rational thought, much like one would in waking life, and 
in fact the thought processes applied to a dream situation have 
much in common with those applied to a situation experienced 
in waking life. Any differences in cognitions between sleep and 
wake may be exemplified by the generation of bizarre scenarios, 
than how the mind approaches those scenarios, in line with Kahn 
and Hobson (36) views.
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Kahn and Hobson (36) further account for the lack of reality 
monitoring during REM sleep dreaming by the reduced activity 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and precuneus, as well as the 
functional disconnect between these structures (32–34), mean-
ing the brain cannot distinguish between who, where and what 
we are within a given context. This can account for not only the 
poor reality monitoring during dreaming, but also the typically 
disorganized or bizarre string of memory sources that comprise 
our dreams (41). As such, the way in which our cognition operates 
across different states may be largely continuous, but there seems 
to exist differences in the organization of our memories between 
sleep and wake. Given the complexities of the characteristics of 
continuity between sleep and wake and even across sleep (7, 19), 
it is unsurprising that efforts to account for continuity have thus 
far been limited.
WHat MiGHt Be tHe FUnCtion oF 
ContinUity?
If we proceed with our definition of consciousness as a holistic 
experience of the present, brief past, long-term past (via memory 
retrieval) and the future (goal directed), we may assume that the 
ability to recall prior experiences, i.e., for continuity to function, 
would allow focus to be maintained in reaching future goals. In 
addition, as with the function of any memory system, the ability 
to recall prior experiences is the consequence of successful learn-
ing and allows those experiences to shape our interaction with the 
world in light of them. The activation of prior experience in a truly 
continuous manner would mean that we need to access all aspects 
of that prior experience. As we have seen, prior experiences are 
rarely recalled episodically, and so perhaps only salient aspects 
are particularly accessible at any one time, depending on need. 
Similarly, during sleep prior experiences may be activated either 
in full [rarely; see Ref. (8)] or in part and the activation of those 
salient aspects may strengthen them for future accessibility (42).
Ordered, controlled, and focused consciousness is also 
deemed to be a marker of psychological health, with authors such 
as Llewellyn (16) suggesting that a less structured or continuous 
consciousness may reflect elements of psychosis. Psychosis is 
characterized by disorganized cognition, seemingly leaping from 
one thought to another. The breakdown of holistic conscious 
experience is also reflected in dissociation; detachment from 
either the perception of reality or separation of the experience of 
the past. The essential feature of Dissociative Disorders is defined 
as “a disruption of and/or discontinuity in the normal integration 
of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception, body 
representation, motor control, and behaviour” (43). The DSM-5 
positions the dissociative disorders next to the trauma- and 
stressor-related disorders, to reflect the close relationship between 
these diagnostic categories (44). Dissociation can be exacerbated 
by sleep loss (45) and sleep disturbances are symptomatic (or per-
haps even causal) of virtually all mental disorders as listed in the 
DSM-5 (43). This implies that sleep serves an integrative function 
for the mind and body. Indeed, in cognitive terms during sleep, 
we activate and re-activate experiences from the past (in particu-
lar the recent past), giving rise to the experience of dreams when 
we can recall the mental activation upon awakening. However, 
as we have already seen, when we explore the characteristics 
of dreams it is evident that consciousness is rarely continuous 
[e.g., Ref. (7, 18)]. As such while sleep may help to maintain order 
of consciousness and overall mental health, it apparently does not 
reflect continuity of it.2
WHat is disContinUity?
If continuity refers to the ability to retrieve the past, and the 
future where relevant (goals), in the context of present awareness 
(consciousness), then it would follow logically that discontinu-
ity is the opposite of this, whereby discontinuity would be the 
inability to retrieve the past or future in the context of the present. 
Also, if continuity involves recalling past experiences holistically, 
discontinuity could refer to recalling them in a fragmentary man-
ner. As we have noted, such discontinuity seems characteristic of 
both waking and sleeping cognition.
However, discontinuity may not always be conceptualized 
in opposition to continuity. Both Hobson and Schredl (14) and 
Malinowski and Horton (5, 6) acknowledge that the continuity-
discontinuity spectrum may be a gradient, rather than discrete 
entities. For example, recalling a dream (continuity of dreaming 
memories to wake) may involve accessing a number of features 
of the original experience, but with some added appraisal of the 
experience and with some features being omitted from memory. 
This appears both continuous and discontinuous at the same 
time. Similarly dreaming of an upcoming social event (from wak-
ing life) may seem largely continuous in the manner of reflecting 
concerns, characters involved and the general setting, but could 
be discontinuous in that the actual future event could never hap-
pen. Here, then dream–wake (or wake–dream) continuity would 
perhaps rarely be clearly either continuous or discontinuous, but 
comprising features of both.
This presents a challenge with conceptualizing continuity and 
discontinuity in operational terms. Future work should aim to 
characterize dream–wake continuity in specific ways, noting 
trends for specific memory features to be either largely continu-
ous or discontinuous.3 This may help to alleviate concerns with 
2 It is necessary to mention here that in these discussions that acknowledge the 
changeable nature of consciousness, we are referring to continuous and discon-
tinuous functioning as a state, rather than a trait. Explorations of dissociative 
tendency typically refer to individuals who experience discontinuity more readily 
and frequently than others. However, my own work has noted that, despite these 
individual differences, there exists great variability within people’s dreaming 
tendencies. As such experiencing a particularly discontinuous dream, for instance, 
should not necessarily indicate problematic cognition or experiences, especially 
of a clinical nature. Furthermore, therapists and clinicians should always be wary 
of relying on dreams as part of any clinical diagnosis, unless sampled reliably 
and systematically. Great biases exist in dream reports, with some individuals 
much more likely to recall dreams generally than others [e.g., see Ref. (46)]. As 
such, encouraging anyone to try to recall a dream could over-rely on creative or 
imaginative processes, rather than capturing a valid dream memory. Similarly, 
some individuals seemingly very ready to report a dream could be particularly 
susceptible to creating the report without apparent effort, falsely believing that 
their report is true (47).
3 One present project within my own lab is exploring this, by creating a dream 
memory database and charting the likelihood of individual memory fragments 
(objects, characters, place, sounds, etc.) as being continuous or discontinuous.
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discontinuity as being merely unexplained variance in models of 
continuity that aim to predict dreaming behavior.
As we have noted, continuity can take many forms. Discon-
tinuity could present as disjointed cognition, with absences 
or lapses in attention (i.e., consciousness being interrupted). 
Alternatively discontinuity could present, in extreme cases, as 
dissociation in waking, or bizarreness in dreams (consciousness 
during sleep). REM dreams are typically bizarre (48, 49), featur-
ing sudden changes and eliciting feelings of strangeness, curiosity 
or mystique upon awakening. As we have seen, dreams very rarely 
feature memories from waking life in a truly episodic form (8, 29) 
and so are, by definition, discontinuous. Indeed, it seems likely 
that the only instances in which memories are replayed in their 
precise manner as they were originally experiences, is when they 
are so emotionally intense and negatively valenced that they were 
traumatic to the individual (50). In sum, full continuity here may 
reflect a maladapted system, while discontinuity is the norm.
Indeed several fields of study indicate the central role of the 
emotionality of a (waking) experience as being important for its 
subsequent recallability (51, 52), consolidation [e.g., Ref. (53, 54)]; 
and, perhaps relatedly, its likelihood of being dreamed about 
[(55, 56); see also Ref. (10) for a review]. Furthermore, some stud-
ies have implied that there exists a relationship between continuity 
and emotional intensity, such that the more intensely emotional 
the experience, the more highly continuous it is, especially if it 
is traumatic in nature [e.g. Ref. (57), see also (58)]. A somewhat 
emotional experience will likely be dreamed about, but in a less 
continuous manner [e.g., see Ref. (7, 19, 55)]. An experience low 
in emotional intensity may be unlikely to require processing or 
be dreamed about (55). Thus, there may be just cause to further 
explore relationships between continuity and emotionality in 
dream studies. Indeed, in order to explore discontinuities across 
sleep and wake, Kunzendorf et  al. (59) reported that dreams 
were more bizarre, more “dream-like,” and more emotional than 
daydreams. Hartmann et al. (60) found that the contextualizing 
images in dreams were more emotionally intense than those in 
daydreams, and also that dreams had mostly fear/terror and help-
lessness/vulnerability as their contextualizing emotion, whereas 
daydreams had no particularly dominant emotions. Thus, con-
sciousness during sleep appears to be more bizarre and emotional 
than daydreams, although emotionality and bizarreness (perhaps 
representing discontinuity) is related across all states. It is also 
interesting to note that daydreams generated under the influ-
ence of extreme emotional intensity are more “dream-like” and 
more symbolic than any other kind of daydream (61). This again 
illustrates that the content of dreams may be different to waking 
thought, but, as above, the cognitions about that content may be 
more similar.
An interesting caveat to the generalization about dreams 
versus daydreams comes from Kunzendorf et al. (59) who found 
that participants with “thin boundaries,” i.e., people who blur 
the lines between various aspects of life (including waking and 
dreaming) more than those with “thick boundaries” who see 
things in more clear-cut, black-and-white terms, had daydreams 
that were equally as bizarre as nocturnal dreams, reinforcing the 
idea that there may exist strong individual differences between 
people who experience continuity and those who do not. 
The assumptions within this paper on the whole refer to patterns 
of general cognitive activity irrespective of any such trait effects. 
However, both the fields of dream science and psychopathology 
indicate that there exist differences between individuals in the 
extent to which they may experience continuity or not. For 
instance, some individuals are more susceptible to nightmares 
than others, which often feature more episodic incorporations 
of waking-life episodes (57). Furthermore and not unrelatedly, 
some individuals are more vulnerable to experiencing dissocia-
tion than others. This raises questions concerning the extent to 
which continuity and discontinuity may be “normal” in terms of 
being psychologically healthy. As stated earlier, continuity may 
reflect maladaptive processing. However, severe discontinuity, as 
in the case of experiencing dissociation, reflects a disorganized 
and interrupted sense of reality and as such is clearly maladap-
tive also. Thus, part of the role of characterizing the extent and 
frequency of experiencing discontinuity should help to address 
the issue of, “how much discontinuity is normal?”
a possiBLe FUnCtion oF 
disContinUity?
If discontinuity is the norm, rather than indicating a disordered 
system as previous literature has implied, it may have a function. 
A number of theories of dreaming and of consciousness have 
attempted to account for discontinuity in the past, and a brief 
review of these will follow.
Hobson et  al.’s (13) AIM model of dreaming focuses on 
dreaming occurring during REM, which has not been empirically 
supported as dreams can be sampled easily from non-REM sleep 
and REM does not always lead to dream recall. Nevertheless, the 
model proposes that with correct activation and cognitive input, 
dreaming will result. A dream report is deemed to be the result 
of a “synthesis” of activations, which taken together are neither 
meaningful nor functional. As such according to this model, 
discontinuity is the norm during REM sleep and is taken to reflect 
the lack of order and purpose of the epiphenomena of dreams.
Somewhat relatedly, models, such as Schredl’s (1, 62), attempt 
to characterize the likelihood of recalling dreams and even 
dreaming of specific material. However, unexplained variance 
remains so high (91.6%) that these models have many more 
factors yet to uncover in the pursuit of understanding the nature 
of dreaming. The as yet unexplained variance may reflect discon-
tinuity, which is difficult to conceptualize let alone predict using 
existing methods and the continuity hypothesis as a theoretical 
underpinning (1), though of course this does not imply necessar-
ily that such discontinuity is unimportant. Rather just that dream 
scientists have much work to do!
An alternative set of views concerns the style of cognitive 
processing that seems typical of REM, or late-night, sleep. As 
Hartmann (21) suggested, but did not test empirically, REM 
sleep cognition may be hyperassociative, in that the links from 
one activated thought to another are more tenuous than in 
waking. Indeed, this is one way of thinking about discontinuity 
as illogical or surprising links from one processing sequence to 
another. In cognitive psychology, this would represent a weak 
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semantic association rather than a strong one, with the latter 
typically reflecting focused thought and goal-oriented process-
ing. Hartmann, however, did not speculate as to what the func-
tion of such hyperassociativity may have been, although he was 
a psychoanalyst and so believed that dreams had a language that 
could be uncovered therapeutically. Implicit in that view was the 
notion that manifest dream content was merely only part of a 
dream’s make-up, meaning that some degree of interpretation 
was required on Hartmann’s part. Such a view is largely at odds 
with more contemporary approaches to dream science, in which 
memory sources of dreams are deemed to reflect more explicitly 
the activation of waking-life experiences that may be processed 
during sleep, perhaps as part of a memory consolidation process 
(2–4).
An alternative body of work from both the sleep and dream-
ing fields explore the creativity associated with REM sleep (in 
particular). The hyperassociative processing style, or “loose” 
connections in Hartmann (21) terms, provide a mental space 
for creativity and novel solutions to become conscious. A great 
deal of evidence shows the relationships between REM sleep and 
creativity [e.g., Ref. (63)]. However, evidence also demonstrates 
the relationships between creativity and dissociation, with the 
latter in part being increased with sleep disturbances, as we have 
already seen (64), reinforcing the complex relationships between 
psychopathology and creativity.
Nevertheless the relationship between REM sleep and novel 
ideas has been shown in a number of empirical investigations 
exploring not only creativity but also problem solving and insight. 
Thus there seems to be something about the activity in REM 
sleep, or at least following several iterations of preceding non-
REM sleep cycles, that promotes the formation of new concepts 
and ideas. Merely re-activating previous experiences episodically, 
i.e., continuity, would not logically facilitate such novelty. Rather, 
then discontinuity may involve the reactivation of some elements 
of previous experiences, but perhaps in parallel with additional 
experiences or in quick succession to dissimilar, or weakly 
associated, experiences—we do not yet know whether such 
hypothesized hyperassociativity operates in parallel or sequen-
tially. We may assume that discontinuity involves the activation 
of memory fragments taken from a number of memory sources 
that are bound together into a conscious uniform experience, as 
dream images seem to comprise such condensed imagery (4, 65). 
If this is the case discontinuity, comprising hyperassociative 
processing, could be evidenced by the analysis of the memory 
sources of dreams. For example, one dream image featuring 
several identified memory sources, such as a character that we 
recognize from recent waking life, a familiar place in which the 
dream is set, the content of a conversation in the dream, as well as 
additional specific features, such as objects, people, or activities, 
can each be rated in terms of the dreamer’s familiarity with them, 
their age or time since being experienced (if at all), as well as 
more general features such as counting the number of memory 
sources in dream images across the night or sampled from differ-
ent stages of sleep. Llewellyn (65) illustrates this in detail with her 
“quicksand dream,” showcasing how various different elements of 
waking life had been recombined and synthesized into a single, 
composite dream event. Llewellyn postulated that this process in 
dreaming operates to create episodic “landmark junctions” at a 
neural level. However, such discontinuity could have many pur-
poses, not least to decontextualize each of the composite memory 
sources, rendering each individual contribution memorable in 
its own right. Such studies of discontinuity could inform much 
about the activation of autobiographical experiences across dif-
ferent states of consciousness.
To this end, discontinuity seems to allow novel insights and 
creative possibilities. However, very few individuals wake from 
a dream experiencing a sudden moment of clarity or enhanced 
understanding into a problem. As such, we cannot assume that 
discontinuity functions to make revelations conscious. Rather, 
discontinuity in sleep, and likely in wake also though perhaps to 
a lesser extent, may reflect offline processing that maintains the 
organization and consolidation of experiences within a neuro-
cognitive system that is constantly being updated. During wake 
the human brain perceives a great wealth of novel information 
that requires processing and integration with existing structures. 
Much of this information will be superfluous to requirements 
and processing will cease very shortly after sensation. However, 
some will be salient enough to require consolidation into long-
term memory networks, to be accessible for future use and to 
require prior knowledge to be updated. Such consolidation and 
re-consolidation likely occur constantly, though sleep seems to 
be the time when much of this consolidation occurs (66–70). 
Furthermore, sleep appears to afford opportunities for the 
reorganization of memory networks (22, 65, 71, 72) and thus 
the integration of newer experiences into pre-existing cortical 
structures (70, 73–75).
In order to evidence the idea that discontinuity engenders 
consolidation and integration of novel experiences with more 
established memory networks, we should be able to identify a 
change in the organization and representation of memory sources 
over time, as they become increasingly integrated. This should 
be mapped on to changes in the continuity, or order, of the 
conscious manifestation of that experience. A handful of dream 
studies have been able to map the activation of a specific memory 
source over time, although unfortunately these studies are varied 
in their methodological approach. Some short-term approaches 
have looked at the organization of memory representations across 
the night, with early-night sleep being rich in non-REM, slow-
wave sleep, and later night sleep being richer in REM (7). More 
recently, we (19) have also demonstrated changes in the continuity 
of memory representations across the night, with dreams being 
sampled from later night sleep being more bizarre yet more inte-
grated with older memory sources. Thus, to evidence a change in 
the organization and representation of a memory over time we 
may expect to see a memory source, appearing in a dream in a 
decreasingly literal manner as it is consolidated. Some postulate 
that the representation may become increasingly metaphorical 
(10), although this is difficult to evidence empirically. Hopefully 
in the future sleep study technology will afford the more accurate 
monitoring of this with neural mapping of the activation of the 
original memory engram along with a representation of the 
extent to which it has been integrated into long-term cortical 
structures. At present, we can rely on subjective dream reports 
and an analysis of their memory sources.
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Long-term approaches have typically explored emotionally 
charged experiences being incorporated into dreams and have 
documented corresponding changes in the characteristics of 
those emotional memory representations over time [e.g., Ref. 
(62, 66, 76)]. Convincing evidence of relations between emotional 
waking-life experiences and dreams comes from studies with 
victims of trauma [for reviews, see Ref. (10, 77)]. For example, 
individuals with direct military experience of war have direct, 
unambiguous, and sometimes apparently veridical dream incor-
porations of their experiences; civilians, on the other hand, have 
“indirect” or “symbolic” incorporations (78). Thus, it may be that 
the more traumatic the experience, the more direct the incorpo-
ration of the experience into dreaming, as is also the case with 
posttraumatic stress disorder symptomatology. Cartwright (76) 
also reports of her studies with divorcees, who dreamed of their 
divorce process over time, and the shift from dream reports being 
more accurately reflective of current concerns and experiences, to 
being more symbolically represented as the divorce process was 
appraised and comes to terms with by the dreamer.
Indeed, these emotional experiences may be particularly per-
tinent. Several theories of sleep-dependent memory processing 
emphasize the role of emotion, either in identifying a particular 
aspect of a memory to be processed (79) or in signaling heightened 
activity during the consolidation process in sleep (80). Stickgold 
and Walker (42) presented a “triage” model of sleep-dependent 
memory consolidation, whereby salient aspects of an experi-
ence are tagged as requiring processing during sleep. Emotional 
intensity likely acts as this triage indicator. Concurrently, a grow-
ing number of studies now indicate that emotional waking-life 
experiences are more likely to feature in dreams compared to 
neutral experiences (9, 19, 55, 62, 81).
The consequence here is that experiences that have been well 
integrated into a memory network and that have been processed 
emotionally, would not manifest in dreams in a manner that 
largely reflects their original experience in waking life. In this way, 
the more discontinuous the representation of the experience, the 
more integrated and perhaps the more accepted (emotionally) it 
has become. Thus discontinuity can reflect a healthy cognitive 
system, rather than being a sign of psychopathology, as has been 
implied in previous accounts of consciousness. This may appear 
counterintuitive but suggests that discontinuity is a functional 
end-point of a cognitive process of integration and consolidation.
tHe CHaraCteristiCs oF MeMory 
eXperienCe aCross sLeep and WaKe
Horton and Malinowski (4) proposed a model of AM consolida-
tion in sleep, whereby memories for waking experiences can 
appear in dreams in largely fragmentary forms and as such differ 
from conventional manifestations of episodic memory. AMs in 
dreams can be sampled from non-REM as well as REM periods, 
which contain fewer episodic references and become more bizarre 
across the night (41, 82). Salient fragmented memory features 
are activated in sleep and rebound with fragments not neces-
sarily emerging from the same memory, thus de-contextualizing 
those memories and manifesting as experiences that differ from 
waking conceptions. The constructive nature of autobiographi-
cal recall further encourages synthesis of these hyperassociated 
images into an episode via recalling and reporting dreams. This 
model of sleep-dependent memory consolidation accounts for 
the discontinuity within REM sleep mentation, and perhaps in 
elements of non-REM sleep reports and in aspects of waking 
also, as the fragmentary activation of specific memories being 
coupled with other memory fragments, giving rise to a new 
image, illustrates discontinuity clearly. Here, we can synthesize 
the characteristics of discontinuity with the activation of frag-
ments of memory sources in sleep.
In sum the discontinuities of cognition in dreams have been 
recognized as being both typical of normal sleep mentation 
behavior, and possibly indicative of problematic dissociative 
symptoms, such as schizophrenia [e.g., Ref. (16)]. In this paper, 
I summarized the elements of continuous and discontinuous 
processing across sleep and wake, recognizing that discontinuities 
in form, of cognition and of consciousness are typical and indeed 
functional of waking processing as well as in dreams (i.e., sleeping 
processing).
The behavioral outcome, i.e., what is consolidated and/or 
consciously experienced is, more often than not, unclear upon 
awakening and usually later following dreaming. As the dream 
memory fades so quickly and it is only in the case of the few 
avid dreamers who may engage in consideration of their dream 
experiences that they claim to have an understanding of what 
their dream “meant” or represented, we cannot assume that a 
clear purpose of dreaming is to have conscious clarity or insight 
following the dream experience. The discontinuity of a dream 
and the associated feelings of bizarreness may contribute to this 
perception that dreams are perhaps not there to be understood 
as such. Nevertheless, discontinuity within and across dreaming 
and waking may still be functional if the activated memory frag-
ments in sleep, manifesting in dream reports, remain accessible 
over and above other, non-incorporated memories at a later date.
ConCLUsion
Discontinuity as we have conceptualized it here is the fragmenta-
tion of experiences as we tend to perceive them in the present. 
That may refer to dreaming of an event from waking life in a very 
different way to the original experience, or it may refer to simply 
recalling an experience in a different way to its original occur-
rence. Thus, discontinuity could refer to the change of a memory 
representation over time, whether that be in a dream or when 
recalled at a later time in waking.
In this paper, I have argued that discontinuity is typical of both 
waking as well as sleeping cognition as in waking it is a normal 
characteristic of autobiographical remembering. During sleep, as 
evidenced from dream reports from across the night, experiences 
from our waking lives are particularly discontinuous as specific 
constituent features of autobiographical experiences are selected 
for processing. However, under the backdrop of continuous 
consciousness, whereby the stream of thoughts, images, and 
cognitions are sewn together into a coherent narrative, individual 
memory fragments are bound together to create a new “episode,” 
which is certainly discontinuous from waking life as it may be 
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implausible, incongruous or impossible (e.g., dreaming of talking 
to someone who has recently passed away).
The consequence of this is that the dream product may pro-
vide insight via consideration of novel experiences, but may not 
have been composed in a deliberately metaphorical or symbolic 
manner.
This leads us to present some testable hypotheses for future 
work in this field, linking sleep-dependent memory consolida-
tion, the characteristics of dreams (of prior waking experiences) 
and the recallability of AMs over time. Experiences from waking 
life (AMs) that have been dreamed about in a discontinuous 
manner would likely be less emotionally intense than those that 
are continuous. Also the memory fragments that were rebound 
with another memory (source) during dreaming should lead to 
enhanced recallability of both the original source of the memory 
fragment as well as the memory source that appeared in the 
dream, relative to memories and fragments that had not been 
dreamed about, due to all these aspects having been activated 
during sleep. A recent study (83), documented the incorporation 
of recent autobiographical experiences into dreams that had been 
documented in a 14-day diary. Memory for those original experi-
ences was tested via recall and recognition. Those experiences 
that had been incorporated into dreams were better recalled 
and recognized later. While this may seem unsurprising as the 
act of reporting a dream could be seen to rehearse those original 
experiences, the representation of the experience in the dream 
was often far different to the original episode. This provides a 
starting framework for exploring links between (dis)continuity 
and memory consolidation of declarative experiences.
These predictions present exciting opportunities for the col-
laboration of dream and sleep scientists with memory consolida-
tion scholars, to explore the nature of sleeping mentation as a 
reflection of the cognitive processes of memory reorganization 
over time. They also should not detract from the contributions 
and efforts of continuity theorists, who may, in part, aim to predict 
dream behaviors given certain parameters. Rather, discontinuity 
needs to be characterized in relation to continuity to help us to 
appreciate further the wonderful changing state of consciousness, 
what it might tell us about the activation of memories during 
sleep; something that neuroimaging methods are not yet able to 
do in a detailed manner.
Furthermore, scholars should continue attempting to identify 
whether patterns of discontinuity and continuity are consistent 
or varied across individuals. For instance, some existing work has 
identified benefits of a labile sleep–wake pattern in terms of the 
number of cycles through sleep stages upon knowledge awareness 
tasks (84, 85) and recent work has identified that lucid dream-
ing training benefits performance in field independence tasks 
(86). As such identifying patterns of cognitive functioning and 
discontinuity of consciousness that seem optimal for both mental 
health and memory consolidation could pave the way for similar 
training or intervention studies, if patterns of discontinuity may 
be changeable across individuals.
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